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I begin by thanking the editors of the Denver University Law Re-
view for inviting me to present my research at their timely symposium
"Marijuana at the Crossroads."' As a legal scholar, I find it both exhila-
rating and frustrating to work in an area of law that is undergoing un-
precedented yet long overdue and painstakingly slow change. The U.S.
War on Drugs, especially the war on cannabis, has long raised serious
questions of liberty, equality, justice, efficiency, federalism, and foreign
policy. In the constitutional domain alone, this war implicates interests
arising under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, Fourteenth,
Fifteenth, and Twenty-first Amendments. 2 On the occasion of this sym-
posium, I wish to offer a short essay3 on a single though important aspect
of the quickly changing landscape of American law in this area, the dis-
tinction between medicinal and recreational uses of cannabis.
To be sure, the line between these uses is often blurred. While some
uses of cannabis are essentially medicinal, that is, and others essentially
recreational, many uses have strong elements of both. Yet, like the dis-
tinction between law and morality,4 medicinal and recreational uses must
be understood as distinct for some practical purposes. In the sixteen
states and the District of Columbia where cannabis has been approved
for medicinal use,5 the distinction between medicinal and recreational
t Associate Professor of Political Science, San Francisco State University. JD, UC Has-
tings, PhD, UCSB
1. January 27, 2012, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law.
2. 1 have written on some of these issues elsewhere. See M.D. Carcieri, Gonzales v. Raich:
An Opening for Rational Drug Law Reform, I TENN. J.L. & POL'Y 307 (2005); M.D. Carcieri, Gon-
zales v. Raich: Congressional Tyranny and Irrelevance in the War on Drugs, 9 U. PENN. J. CONST.
L. 1131 (2007) [hereinafter Carcieri, Gonzales v. Raich]; M.D. Carcieri, Rawls and Reparations, 15
MICH. J. RACE & L. 267 (2010) [hereinafter Carcieri, Rawls]; M.D. Carcieri, Obama, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Drug War, 44 AKRON L. REV. 303 (2011) [hereinafter Carcieri, Obama]; and
M.D. Carcieri, California's Proposition 19: Selective Prohibition and Equal Basic Liberties, 46
U.S.F. L. REV. 479 (2012) [hereinafter Carcieri, California's Proposition 19].
3. In the spirit of a short essay, and to avoid redundancy, I shall not provide extensive argu-
ment on all aspects of the topics I touch upon, and invite the interested reader to see where I have
developed them in my previous work.
4. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 593, 597 (1958).
5. See, e.g., Chris Roberts, Rolling Paper: Looking at the Current State of Safe Access, SF
WKLY. (July 20, 2011), http://www.sfweekly.com/2011-07-20/culture/medical-marijuana-safe-
access-update-chris-roberts/; Dana Mattioli, High Hopes at Miracle-Gro in Medical Mariuana




use has concrete legal significance. In those states, whether adults caught
by police with small amounts of cannabis can avoid arrest and criminal
charges will often turn on whether they can produce a physician's au-
thentic note approving use of cannabis for medicinal purposes. Under
federal law and the law of other states, by contrast, the distinction be-
tween medicinal and recreational use is legally meaningless. All cannabis
use is a crime under such laws, although punishment for conviction var-
ies.
Yet what about constitutional law-is the medicinal-recreational
distinction significant there? I have two answers. As an empirical matter
of Supreme Court case law, I submit that the distinction is less signifi-
cant than one might have assumed. I shall illustrate this by showing how
the medicinal-recreational distinction shows up under Commerce Clause
and Fourteenth Amendment analysis. As a normative matter of how citi-
zens should vote on upcoming state ballot initiatives seeking to replace
cannabis prohibition with regimes of regulation and taxation, I submit
that the distinction should be no barrier to support for such measures.
The bottom line is that since government, for good reasons, does not
require that even dangerous, highly addictive drugs like alcohol or tobac-
co be consumed solely for medicinal purposes, the equal liberty principle
at the core of our Constitution forbids it to do so with a less dangerous,
less addictive substance like cannabis.
II. THE EMPIRICAL DOMAIN OF U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Commerce Clause
As of this writing, in consolidated landmark rulings, the Supreme
Court has recently upheld the constitutionality of the individual mandate
at the heart of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.6 Alt-
hough the majority rejected Congress's authority to impose the mandate
under its commerce power, and upheld it only under the taxing power,
these cases have kept the Commerce Clause on the front pages of major
newspapers for several months. As it happens, the last major decision in
this area was Gonzales v. Raich.7 In Raich, the Court affirmed Con-
gress's commerce power to enact, and oversee strict enforcement of the
federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), particularly its complete ban
on any use of any amount of cannabis for any purpose, even by adults
and even in the privacy of their homes.9
By the time the Court heard Raich, it had developed a two-part rule
to test the limits of Congress's commerce power. First, the activity tar-
geted by Congress must be commerce, or at least economic activity. If
6. Nat'l Fed'n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
7. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
8. See id. at 33.
9. Id. at 42.
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that initial requirement is satisfied, then Congress may regulate the activ-
ity so long as it has a rational basis to conclude that, in the aggregate, the
activity exerts a substantial effect on interstate commerce.' 0 For our pur-
poses, the key point is that the threshold inquiry is only whether the ac-
tivity targeted is economic, regardless of whether such activity is done
for a medicinal or recreational purpose." From a Commerce Clause
perspective, then, medicinal and recreational uses are identical insofar as
the activity targeted by federal law--consumption of cannabis-is the
same regardless of whether it takes place for medicinal or recreational
purposes.12
B. Fourteenth Amendment
While it has addressed other aspects of cannabis law,13 the Supreme
Court has never specified the standard of review-the level of scrutiny-
that laws imposing cannabis prohibition must survive upon challenge
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Lower federal and state supreme
courts addressing the issue have held that such laws are subject to mere
rational basis scrutiny, which they generally survive. 14 On a correct read-
10. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557-560 (1995); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
11. Such a limited inquiry suggests why States under their police power, not Congress under
its commerce power, should presumptively be allowed to legislate in this area where the activity in
question is not interstate commerce.
12. In his controlling opinion, Justice Stevens concedes that the medicinal-recreational dis-
tinction is meaningless from a commerce clause perspective, and that both types of use are on the
same side of the boundary between what Congress can and cannot reach under its commerce power.
See Raich, 545 U.S. at 25-29. 1 agree with him on these points, but disagree about which side of the
line they are both on. Beyond the problems with stretching the word "commerce" of Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3
to be synonymous with the broader term "economic," at least some human activity must be non-
economic. Otherwise, not only can Congress regulate any activity it wants, which is flatly incon-
sistent with the commerce clause's grant of power to regulate only that which is commerce, but we
are also left with a very impoverished view of society, one in which there is never any distinction,
for example, between marital sex and prostitution. In this spirit, the private adult use of cannabis,
whether for medicinal or recreational purposes, cannot simply be reduced to economic activity-
done either to maximize one's chances of financial gain or to minimize one's chances of financial
loss. I submit that it is rather generally done, under either category, simply to feel better.
Justice Stevens relied heavily on the analogy between Raich and Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942), a New Deal era case in which Congress's power to regulate a farmer's production
and consumption of wheat was upheld under the Commerce Clause. Yet not only is Wickard inappo-
site insofar as Congress was in that case truly regulating an interstate market with the Agricultural,
Adjustment Act, while the Controlled Substances Act involved in Raich is an attempt to destroy an
interstate market using federal criminal law, but Justice Stevens cherry picks Wickard out of a range
of relevant precedents. He ignores the force of later cases like Lopez and Morrison as well as of
earlier landmark cases like Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Even so staunch a Fed-
eralist as John Marshall saw the need to draw clear lines between what Congress can and cannot
reach under the Commerce Clause. I thus agree that while key constitutional words like "commerce"
must have some breathing room, they must also have limits. Otherwise, quite simply, a written
Constitution is a sham. As Marshall saw and explained in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch)
137 (1803), this is not an option. See generally Carcieri, Gonzales v. Raich, supra note 2.
13. Besides Raich, see United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 582 U.S. 483
(2001), which held that there is no medical necessity exception to the Controlled Substances Act.
14. See, e.g., Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 866 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Fogarty,
692 F.2d 542, 547 (8th Cir. 1982); NORML v. Bell, 488 F. Supp. 123, 134 (D.D.C. 1980); State v.
Sunderland, 168 P.3d 526, 539 (Haw. 2007) (Moon, C.J., concurring and dissenting); State v.
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ing of the Court's leading, relevant Fourteenth Amendment case law,
however, I have argued that such laws are properly subject to strict scru-
tiny. 1 I have justified this partly on grounds that the racist origins and
racially disparate impact of cannabis prohibition establishes a suspect
classification,16 but primarily because laws imposing cannabis prohibi-
tion burden the fundamental right of bodily autonomy (i.e., presumptive
control over the boundaries and contents of our bodies).' 7
Strict scrutiny, of course, is an ends-means analysis. The medici-
nal-recreational distinction might thus be relevant as government tries to
show that the ends and means of cannabis prohibition are constitutionally
adequate. Yet the key point for our purposes is that before ends and
means can be assessed, the applicable level of ends-means scrutiny must
be established, and at this crucial, threshold stage of inquiry, the distinc-
tion is irrelevant. Whether cannabis is used medicinally or recreationally,
that is, cannabis prohibition burdens the fundamental right to control the
contents and boundaries of one's body, triggering strict scrutiny on that
account.
The United States government might be able to provide reasons for
prohibition of private adult cannabis use that would survive the rigor of
strict scrutiny. However, judging from the longstanding quality of propa-
ganda on the Drug Enforcement Administration and Office of National
Drug Control Policy websites, this seems doubtful. Indeed, it is not clear
that such prohibition can even pass rational basis scrutiny. Thus, beyond
Congress's dubious commerce authority to make private adult cannabis
use a federal crime, even state cannabis prohibition, with the legitimacy
flowing from the police power, is on weak ground under a faithful read-
ing of Fourteenth Amendment case law. My point, however, is that the
medicinal-recreational use distinction is irrelevant to the crucial, thresh-
old Fourteenth Amendment question of the applicable level of scrutiny.
III. THE NORMATIVE DOMAIN OF FUTURE STATE BALLOT INITIATIVES
Yet there is more. As interesting as the U.S. constitutional law of
cannabis may be, the Supreme Court is not where the action is on reform
in this area. Indeed, the action is not even in the federal government, as
Congress has long been intransigent on this issue,' 8 and the Obama Ad-
Maalan, 950 P.2d 178, 183-184 (Haw. 1998); Seeley v. State, 940 P.2d 604, 612 (Wash. 1997);
State v. Smith, 610 P.2d 869, 874 (Wash. 1980).
15. See generally Carcieri, Obama, supra note 2. Laws banning heroin, cocaine, and metham-
phetamine might pass strict scrutiny. My point is that, on a correct reading of the case law, strict
scrutiny would apply to them, too.
16. See Carcieri, Obama, supra note 2, at 324-326, since those pages in my Akron article
present my (brief) case that cannabis prohibition embodies a suspect classification for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes.
17. See id. at 311-323.
18. Congress has, for example, long refused even to instruct the DEA not to harass sick pa-
tients in states with medical cannabis laws. See, e.g., Hinchey Encouraged by Record House Support
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ministration, in full re-election mode, has recently increased harassment
of cannabis dispensaries in California and Colorado.1 9 Fortunately, we
are not doomed to wait for any of the three branches of the national gov-
ernment to be the catalyst for rational reform in this area. In 2012, can-
nabis law-reform momentum is with the States, where voters on upcom-
ing measures seeking to replace cannabis prohibition with regimes of
taxation and regulation20 are not bound by the technical rules of ends-
means analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Turning to the normative question, regardless of whether govern-
ment could satisfy strict scrutiny of cannabis in court, this should still not
matter for voters contemplating upcoming revisions of California's
Proposition 19.21 The reason is that where the law, for reasons well and
widely understood,22 merely regulates the consumption of dangerous
drugs like alcohol and tobacco, the prohibition of less dangerous sub-
stances like cannabis violates the core principle of constitutional democ-
racy on which we all depend, the principle of equal basic liberties.23 i a
free society, where the law creates a presumption of liberty, each person
has a vital interest in not having his liberty denied while others are al-
lowed an equal or more harmful liberty. Civil liberty is thus fused with
equality, yielding the equal liberty principle. A core command of this
principle, embodied in the Rawlsian idea of "justice as regularity,"2 4 is
that "similar cases be treated similarly. Men could not regulate their ac-
tions by means of rules if this precept were not followed." 25
In this light, as well as the insignificance of the medicinal-
recreational distinction under U.S. constitutional law, I submit that this
for Medical Mariuana; Vows to Keep Fighting for Amendment, STATES NEWS SERVICE, July 25,
2007.
19. See Henry K. Lee, Judge Won't Block Federal Crackdown on Medical Pot, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Dec. 1, 2011, http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Judge-won-t-halt-
federal-medical-pot-crackdown-2339891.php; Felisa Cardona, 25 Colorado Medical Maryjuana
Dispensaries Told to Move Away from Schools or Close, DENVER POST, Mar. 23, 2012,
http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_20240930/25-dispensaries-told-move-away-from-
schools-or.
20. Notwithstanding misleading opinion/editorial commentary in top California newspapers,
Proposition 19 received 46% of the vote in 2010. See generally Carcieri, California's Proposition
19, supra note 2. At this writing, revisions of Proposition 19 have qualified for placement on the
2012 ballot in Colorado and Washington, yet the parallel campaign in California is in disarray. See
Joe Mozingo, Effort to Put Mariuana Legalization Measure on Ballot Is in Disarray, LOS ANGELES
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/10/local/la-me-pot-initiatives-20120310.
21. Proposition 19 would have changed California cannabis law from a regime of prohibition
to one of regulation and taxation. See Carcieri, California's Proposition 19, supra note 2, at 480 n.8.
Colorado and Washington have now qualified initiatives modeled on Proposition 19 for their No-
vember 2012 ballots. See Mozingo, supra note 20.
22. Not only did the U.S. repeal alcohol prohibition as a policy, economic and constitutional
failure, see U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, but in a free society, adults must presumptively be allowed to
decide what goes in their bodies.
23. See Carcieri, Rawls, supra note 2, at 53, 171-227; Carcieri, California's Proposition 19,
supra note 2, at 484-491.
24. Carcieri, Rawls, supra note 2, at 208.
25. Id. at 209; see also Carcieri, Obama, supra note 2, at 323-324.
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distinction should be no barrier to voting for state ballot initiatives seek-
ing to replace cannabis prohibition with regimes of taxation and regula-
tion. Beyond the CSA's dubious legitimacy under the Commerce Clause,
and even beyond doubts that federal or state cannabis prohibition could
survive rational basis scrutiny (never mind the strict scrutiny that would
properly apply), the inconsistency of merely regulating dangerous, addic-
tive drugs like alcohol and tobacco while prohibiting and thus criminaliz-
ing less dangerous, less addictive drugs like cannabis deeply violates the
equal liberty principle.
Measures like Proposition 21526 in 1996 effectively used medicinal
use as a wedge issue, a way to lay the foundation for measures like Prop-
osition 19, fourteen years later. Yet because prohibition of private adult
recreational use is just as suspect from the perspective of equal basic
liberties as prohibition of private adult medicinal use, voters can support
upcoming measures like those in Washington and Colorado with a clear
conscience, knowing that they are voting to remove a profound,
longstanding injustice in their law.
26. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2012); see Carcieri, Gonzales v. Raich,
supra note 2, at 1132.
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